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ON VAGUE ESCHATOLOGY
Michael J. Almeida
Ted Sider's Proportionality o f Justice condition requires that any two moral 
agents instantiating nearly the same moral state be treated in nearly the same 
way. I provide a countermodel in supervaluation semantics to the proportion­
ality of justice condition. It is possible that moral agents S and S' are in nearly 
the same moral state, S' is beyond all redemption and S is not. It is consistent 
with perfect justice then that moral agents that are not beyond redemption go 
determinately to heaven and moral agents that are beyond all redemption go 
determinately to hell. I conclude that moral agents that are in nearly the same 
moral state may be treated in very unequal ways.
Introduction
It's a familiar eschatological view that there are people in each possible 
state in the afterlife. Some people go determinately and eternally to heaven 
and some people go determinately and eternally to hell. And everyone 
that goes to purgatory will eventually go determinately and eternally to 
heaven. The familiar eschatological view rejects the doctrine of universal- 
ism. According to universalism all are ultimately redeemed to enjoy eter­
nal communion with God. Universalism ensures that no human beings 
are beyond redemption; every human being (or perhaps every being that 
can go to heaven) does go to heaven.
Suppose that an essentially perfectly just being must select a princi­
ple of justice that will provide the basis for evaluating the lives of moral 
agents. The principle of justice will provide the moral justification for the 
distribution of punishments and rewards in the afterlife. Since we have 
assumed that universalism is false, an adequate principle of justice must 
provide a moral justification for distributing punishments and rewards 
in such a way that some people go determinately and eternally to heaven 
and some people go determinately and eternally to hell.
In section (2) I consider Ted Sider's Degree o f Goodness Argument. The 
argument assumes that the goodness and badness of moral agents is a 
matter of degree. For each moral state that an agent might instantiate, 
there is another moral state he might instantiate that is nearly the same 
in value. The argument also advances a formal proportionality condition 
on principles of justice. The condition requires that any two moral agents 
instantiating nearly the same moral state be treated in nearly the same 
way. Call that the proportionality o f justice condition.
FAITH AND PHILOSOPHY 
Vol. 25 No. 4 October 2008 
All rights reserved
359
360 Faith and Philosophy
Among other things the proportionality of justice condition demands 
that rewards and punishments in the afterlife be proportionate to the 
goodness or badness of moral agents. In particular any two moral agents 
instantiating nearly the same moral state should receive nearly the same 
punishment or reward. But, according to the Degree o f Goodness Argument, 
no principle of justice that observes the proportionality of justice and the 
degrees of goodness among moral agents could distribute rewards and 
punishments in such a way that some people go determinately and eter­
nally to heaven and some people go determinately and eternally to hell. 
We must therefore abandon the familiar eschatological view.1
In section (3) I generalize Sider's Degree of Goodness Argument. In section 
(4) I offer a countermodel in supervaluation semantics to the proportional­
ity of justice condition. It is not a requirement of justice that moral agents 
that are in nearly the same moral states be treated in nearly the same way. 
It is possible that there is an important and non-arbitrary moral difference 
between moral agents instantiating nearly the same moral state. It is pos­
sible, for instance, that moral agents S and S' are in nearly the same moral 
state, S' is beyond redemption and S is not.2 I conclude that moral agents 
in nearly the same moral state may be treated in very unequal ways.3
In (5) I consider the possibility that only those moral agents that reject 
God as their savior are beyond redemption. I offer the Degree o f Acceptance 
argument against the proportionality of justice condition. In (6) I consider 
an objection from higher-order vagueness. I argue that we should reject the 
proportionality of justice condition in favor of the Moral Difference Thesis 
and the Vague Depravity Thesis. I offer some concluding remarks in (7).
The Degree o f Goodness Argument
According to Ted Sider any adequate principle of justice must meet the 
proportionality of justice condition. Here is Sider.
[J]ustice requires its judgments to be proportional to the [morally 
relevant] factors. If Sally's performance is better than Jimmy's then, 
other things being equal, it would of course be unjust to pay Jimmy 
more; but if Sally's performance is only minutely better than Jimmy's, it 
would be unjust to pay Sally far more. . . . What I am calling the propor­
tionality o f justice prohibits very unequal treatment o f persons who are very 
similar in relevant respects.4
The proposed condition on principles of justice is a purely formal condi­
tion. Compare, for instance, the proportionality condition in (J).
J. For any moral agents S and S', if S and S' are the exactly same in ev­
ery morally relevant respect, then S and S' should be treated in the 
same way.
The condition in (J) demands that moral agents that share every property 
relevant to the distribution of benefits and burdens must be treated the 
same way. The condition in (J) is typically regarded as an uncontroversial 
constraint on every substantive principle of justice from utilitarian prin­
ciples to libertarian principles to liberal egalitarian or Rawlsian principles.
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The properties relevant to the proper distribution of benefits and burdens 
might include utility-maximization, need, effort, merit or simply choice. 
Moral agents that are exactly the same with respect to the relevant proper­
ties, whatever those properties happen to be, must be treated in morally 
equivalent ways.5
The proportionality of justice condition that Sider describes applies to 
moral agents that are nearly the same in morally relevant respects. Consider 
the conditions in (J').
J'. For any moral agents S and S', if S is not definitely morally worse 
than S', then S and S' should not be treated in very unequal ways.
(J') is also proposed as a perfectly general constraint on principles of jus­
tice. According to the condition in (J'), if S is not clearly morally worse 
than S', then S and S' should not be treated in very unequal ways.
In the Degree of Goodness Argument, the moral states of individual agents 
alone determine the proper distribution of punishments and rewards 
among those agents. A principle of justice meeting Sider's proportion­
ality of justice condition must distribute punishments and rewards to 
moral agents in proportion to the degree of goodness or badness of their 
moral states.
The degree of goodness or badness of each moral state an agent might 
instantiate is determined by the number and kind of actions the agent per­
forms. Suppose the degree of badness of each moral state is a simple mat­
ter of the number of minor offenses a moral agent has committed. Here is 
Sider's Degree o f Goodness Argument.
Suppose . . . that the divine criterion is based on how many obsceni­
ties one utters (the more the worse). Suppose further that there are 
no gaps in realized obscenity levels, in that for no n is it the case that 
someone utters n obscenities, someone utters some greater number 
of obscenities, and no one utters n +1 obscenities. . . . Now choose 
some arbitrarily damned person, who on Earth uttered some num­
ber n of obscenities, and begin going through the afterlife, finding 
persons that were less and less obscene. Initially these persons will 
all be in hell, but eventually we will arrive at one in heaven. In fact 
there must be a sharp cutoff point in this procedure . . . . This is a 
consequence of (i) the lack of gaps in realized obscenity levels (ii) the 
binary conception of the afterlife and (iii) . . . that obscenity is a moral 
matter of degree . . . . But such a cutoff would be monstrous, for it 
would blatantly violate the proportional nature of justice. . . . [N]o 
just God could give radically different treatment to a pair of persons 
who differed only by a single obscenity.6
The repugnant conclusion of the Degree of Goodness Argument is that the 
first moral agent S' to go determinately and eternally to hell will have ut­
tered n +1 obscenities and the last moral agent S to go determinately and 
eternally to heaven will have uttered n obscenities.
It's obvious that S and S' are treated in very unequal ways. S is go­
ing determinately to heaven and S' is going determinately to hell. But S' 
has committed just one more minor offense than S, so S' is not definitely
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worse than S. We have a clear violation of the proportionality of justice 
condition. If S' is not definitely worse than S, then no principle of justice 
can recommend that S' go determinately to hell and S go determinately 
to heaven.
It is worth noting that not having such a cutoff would be at least as 
monstrous. Assume for reductio ad absurdum that, for all moral agents 
S and S', if S utters n obscenities and S' utters n -  1 obscenities, then S 
goes determinately and eternally to hell only if S' goes determinately and 
eternally to hell. If the degree of badness of each moral state is a simple 
matter of the number of minor offenses a moral agent has committed and 
non-universalism is true, as we have assumed, then there is some number 
of obscenities n such that any agent that utters n obscenities goes determi­
nately and eternally to hell. By hypothesis, for any n such that anyone who 
utters n obscenities goes determinately and eternally to hell only if anyone 
who utters n -  1 obscenities goes determinately and eternally to hell. By 
repeated applications of the hypothesis we can conclude that everyone 
goes determinately and eternally to hell. So having no cutoff is at least as 
monstrous as having some cutoff.
According to the Degree of Goodness Argument the predicates 'being in 
hell' and 'being in heaven' are not vague. It is not possible to be indeter­
minately in heaven or to be indeterminately in hell. But the argument also 
assumes that, for every possible moral state, some agent instantiates that 
moral state in the afterlife. If there are moral agents in heaven and hell, 
then there is very good reason to conclude that the proportionality condi­
tion in (J') has been violated.7
Degree o f Goodness Argument Generalized
The Degree of Goodness Argument generalizes to any sequence of minor 
evil actions that determines the degree of goodness or badness of moral 
agents. The obscenity criterion is no more than a useful expository device. 
Sider observes that it's not central to the argument.
No one would seriously propose obscenity as the divine criterion, 
but the argument generalizes to apply to more realistic proposals. 
Choose any moral matter of degree you like: number of charitable do­
nations made, number of hungry fed, naked clothed or feet washed, 
number of random acts of kindness performed, or even some amal­
gam of several factors.8
Let k0 be among the best moral states a human being might attain.9 Let k be 
among the worst moral states a human being might attain. The argument 
urges that there is a sequence S of moral states kn (k0 < kn < k) such that, 
for some increment in evil i (i > 0), no moral state k^^ is definitely worse 
than the preceding moral state kni and the moral state k is much worse 
than k0.10
The Degree o f Goodness Argument assumes that there are moral agents 
instantiating every moral state in the sequence.11 Moral agents that instan­
tiate the moral state k0 go determinately and eternally to heaven and moral 
agents that instantiate the moral state k go determinately and eternally
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to hell. If we let << symbolize 'much worse than' and let ~ symbolize 'not 
definitely worse than,' the sequence S is described as follows.
S = k. ~ k„ , k,. ~ k. , L. ~ k,. , . . , k ~ k . & k << k„
It is assumed that there are increments (or decrements) insignificant 
enough that the moral state k{n+1)l resulting from having committed n + 1 
minor evils is not definitely worse than the moral state km resulting from 
having committed n minor evils. The assumption that there are insignifi­
cant evils is not intended to commit us to the controversial position that 
there are unnoticeable evils or imperceptible increments in pain or suffer­
ing. The assumption does commit us to the plausible position that there 
are minor evils.
According to the proportionality of justice condition in (J') any two 
moral agents S and S' in adjacent moral states k(n+1)t and km must be treated 
in nearly the same way. We know that moral agents instantiating k go de­
terminately and eternally to hell. But we also know that there is some first 
moral agent in the sequence that goes to heaven. As we move from k down 
the sequence toward the best moral state in k0 there is some kn (k0 < kn < k) 
such that moral agents instantiating the moral state k(n+1)i go determinately 
and eternally to hell and moral agents instantiating the moral state in kni 
go determinately and eternally to heaven.
But the recommendation that moral agents instantiating moral state kni 
go determinately to heaven and moral agents instantiating the moral state 
k(n1)i go determinately to hell violates the proportionality of justice condi­
tion (J'). Contrary to (j'), there are two moral agents instantiating adjacent 
moral states k(n+1)t and km that are treated in very unequal ways.
Irredeemable Evil and Supervaluationism
The Degree of Goodness Argument shows that any principle of justice avail­
able to God that respects degrees of goodness and badness among moral 
agents will violate the proportionality condition in (J'). But consider whether 
principles of justice are in general required to meet the condition in (J').
Suppose that an agent S instantiates an irredeemably evil moral state 
km if and only if S is himself irredeemably evil.12 And suppose a moral state 
k is irredeemably evil if and only if k is sufficiently bad that God cannot 
save any agent that instantiates kni.13
It is impossible, then, that S instantiates an irredeemably evil moral 
state and also goes determinately to heaven.14 Given the binary conception 
of the afterlife—that every agent goes determinately to heaven or goes 
determinately to hell—a moral agent S is irredeemably evil only if S goes 
determinately and eternally to hell.15 Let's stipulate finally that only those 
moral agents that are beyond redemption go determinately and eternally 
to hell. Every moral agent that is not irredeemably evil goes determinately 
and eternally to heaven.16
Suppose that some moral agent S' is not definitely worse than moral 
agent S. We can assume that S instantiates the moral state kni and S' 
instantiates the adjacent moral state k(n+1)i in the sequence S . The open 
question is whether it is possible that S' is irredeemably evil and S is not 
irredeemably evil. The question is whether there might be an important
and non-arbitrary moral difference between moral agents that instantiate 
adjacent moral states.17
Notice that the predicates 'is morally worse than' and 'is irredeemably 
evil' do not sharply divide their positive and negative extensions. Given 
the assumption of non-universalism and the assumption that only those 
beyond redemption go determinately to hell, we know there is a moral 
state k that is redeemably evil and another moral state k that is irre-ni mi
deemably evil.18 And since these predicates do not sharply divide their 
positive and negative extensions, there are many moral states in the se­
quence that are neither redeemably evil nor irredeemably evil. There are 
also moral states in the sequence k and k such that the moral state k 
is clearly morally worse than the moral state km. But there are many moral 
states such that k is not clearly morally worse than k .
On supervaluation semantics the truth-value of the proposition "the 
moral state k is morally worse than the moral state k " can be determinedmi ni
only if we sharpen the vague predicate 'is morally worse than.' But there is 
no unique and non-arbitrary way to make the predicate 'is morally worse 
than' precise. Supervaluationism therefore makes it true that the moral 
state k is morally worse than the moral state k if and only if that proposi­
tion is true on every admissible precisification of 'is morally worse than.' 
And supervaluationism makes it false that the moral state k is morally 
worse than kni if and only if that proposition is false on every admissible 
precisification of that predicate. Otherwise the proposition is neither true 
nor false.
Supervaluation semantics places some important restrictions on ad­
missible precisifications. The most important restrictions to consider here 
concern the penumbral connections holding between the predicates 'is ir­
redeemably evil' and 'is morally worse than.' The penumbral connections 
in P and P', for instance, seem true.
P. For all n, m and for any i, k is irredeemably evil and k is redeem-mi ni
ably evil only if k is morally worse than k .mi ni
P'. For all n, m and for any i, k is irredeemably evil and k is not irre-mi ni
deemably evil only if k is not morally worse than k .
So there are no admissible precisifications of these predicates on which the 
antecedents of these conditionals are true and the consequents are false. 
But the Degree of Goodness Argument assumes in addition that P'' is true.
P''. For all n, m and for any i, k is irredeemably evil and k is not irre­
deemably evil only if k is definitely morally worse than k .
If S is irredeemably evil and S' is not irredeemably evil then there is an im­
portant and non-arbitrary moral difference between S and S'. But if there 
is an important and non-arbitrary moral difference between moral agents 
S and S', then according to P'', S and S' cannot be in adjacent moral states 
k(n+1)i and km. In other words, if there is an important and non-arbitrary 
moral difference between moral agents S and S', then S and S' cannot be in 
nearly the same moral state.
But the penumbral connection in P'' is mistaken. It is possible that moral 
agents S and S' are in adjacent moral states k(n+1)t and km, and also that there
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is an important and non-arbitrary moral difference between S and S'. Sup­
pose k(n+1)i is definitely irredeemably evil and km is not definitely irredeem­
ably evil. It might also be true that k is not definitely morally worse than 
km. Consider figure (1) in which both predicates are depicted.
Not Morally Worse than kni
|----------- -"
k
|---------
Redeemably Evil
Morally Worse than kni
-i- i------------ 1
k k kni (n+1)i
|--|------------ |
Irredeemably Evil
Fig. 1
In figure (1) the moral state k(n+1)i is in the shaded area on the top line. 
Moral states to the left of the shaded area are definitely not morally worse 
than km and moral states to the right of the shaded area are definitely mor­
ally worse than k . Since the moral state k is in the shaded area on the 
top line, it is not definitely morally worse than kn.  But on the bottom line 
the moral state k is not in the shaded area and the moral state k is in(n+1)i ni
the shaded area. So the moral state k(n+1)i is definitely irredeemably evil and 
kni is not definitely irredeemably evil.
Let's show that the situation depicted in figure (1) is possible. As we 
move incrementally up the sequence of moral states from k0 to k there is 
some small increment i (i > 0) such that moral agents instantiating moral 
state k(n+1)i are definitely irredeemably evil and moral agents instantiating 
kni are not definitely irredeemably evil. Moral agents instantiating kni are 
borderline irredeemably evil. And since we have assumed that moral agents 
might be in nearly the same moral states, it is possible to choose an incre­
ment i (i > 0) sufficiently small that the state k(n+1)i is not definitely morally 
worse than that state kni . Moral agents instantiating k(n+1)i are in nearly the 
same moral state as moral agents instantiating kni . But then for some incre­
ment i (i > 0) in the sequence S, k(n+1)i is definitely irredeemably evil and kni 
is borderline irredeemably evil, and k t is not definitely worse than km. 
This is the situation depicted in figure (l).
According to the Degree of Goodness Argument every moral state in se­
quence S is instantiated. There is therefore some moral agent S that instan­
tiates the moral state in kni and some moral agent S' that instantiates the 
moral state in k{n+1).- The moral agent S' is definitely irredeemably evil and 
moral agent S is borderline irredeemably evil. Suppose an essentially per­
fectly just being applied the following principles of justice to S and S'.19
PJ1. Moral agents that are definitely irredeemably evil cannot be saved 
and so must go determinately and eternally to hell.
PJ2. Moral agents that are borderline irredeemably evil can be saved 
and so go determinately to heaven.
On the basis of principle PJ1, the agent S' goes determinately and eternally 
to hell and on the basis of PJ2 the agent S goes determinately and eternally 
to heaven.
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It is true that S' is not definitely morally worse than S. But there is none­
theless an important and non-arbitrary moral difference between S and 
S'. S' is definitely irredeemably evil and so S' cannot be saved. But S is 
borderline irredeemably evil and so S can be saved.
We should conclude that the proportionality of justice condition in J' is 
false. It does not in general violate the proportionality of justice not to treat 
S and S' in nearly the same way even when S' is not definitely worse than 
S. If S is borderline irredeemably evil and S' is definitely irredeemably evil, 
then S' is not definitely worse than S, but it is not possible to treat S and S' 
in nearly the same way. S' is definitely beyond redemption and cannot be 
saved; S is not definitely beyond redemption and can be saved.
What about Degrees of Acceptance?
Suppose it is true that no moral agent that does not reject God as his sav­
ior—no matter how many obscenities he has uttered during his lifetime—is 
beyond redemption. The Degree o f Goodness Argument assumes that there 
is some number of obscenities n such that anyone uttering n obscenities 
goes determinately and eternally to hell. We are assuming instead that 
only those moral agents that reject God as savior go determinately and 
eternally to hell.
Let's suppose that God provides every moral agent with a final op­
portunity to accept or reject him as his savior. There are of course vari­
ous more or less definite ways to reject God as savior. Perhaps Smith is 
asked whether he accepts God as his savior and Smith indefinitely shakes 
his head no, or Smith is asked whether he accepts God as his savior and 
he indefinitely utters 'no.' In order to simplify matters let's suppose that 
moral agents are provided with a sequence of cards on which there are 
various shades from definitely red to definitely orange. Suppose agents are 
instructed to hold up the card that is definitely red if they definitely reject 
God as their savior. Moral agents are instructed to hold up a card that is 
indefinitely red if they indefinitely reject God as savior.20 In general moral 
agents are more indefinite in their rejection of God as the cards they hold 
up are less definitely red. Finally moral agents are instructed to hold up 
the definitely orange card to definitely accept God as their savior.
Now suppose an essentially perfectly just being applies the following 
principles of justice to S and S'.
PJ3. Every moral agent that definitely rejects God as his savior cannot 
be saved and so goes determinately and eternally to hell.
PJ4. Every moral agent that does not definitely reject God as his savior 
can be saved and so goes determinately and eternally to heaven.
Essentially perfectly just beings that apply PJ3 and PJ4 send moral agents 
determinately and eternally to hell only if they definitely reject God as their 
savior. Moral agents that do not definitely reject God as their savior are sent 
to heaven. We assume that everyone knows that only those moral agents 
that definitely reject God as their savior are sent determinately and eternally 
to hell. And everyone knows that every moral agent that does not definitely 
reject God as their savior is sent determinately and eternally to heaven.
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Assume that for every card in the sequence there is some moral agent 
that holds up that card. There will be a card fc that is definitely red and 
a card kni that is just a shade different and not definitely red. Every moral 
agent that holds up km goes determinately and eternally to heaven and ev­
ery moral agent that holds up card k goes determinately and eternally 
to hell. So there will be moral agents S and S' such that, S definitely rejects 
God as his savior and S' does not definitely reject God as his savior, and 
the card S holds up is not definitely more red than the card S' holds up.
S is sent determinately and eternally to hell because S definitely rejects 
God as his savior and cannot be saved. S' is not sent determinately and 
eternally to hell because S' does not definitely reject God as his savior and 
can be saved. The card S holds up is not definitely more red than the card 
S' holds up, so the attitude that S expresses is not definitely worse than 
the attitude that S' expresses. But there is an important and non-arbitrary 
moral difference between S and S'. The important moral difference is that 
S definitely rejects God as his savior and cannot be saved and S' is on the 
borderline of rejecting God as his savior and can be saved.
Degrees o f Goodness and Higher-Order Vagueness
Let's consider an important objection from higher-order vagueness that 
there cannot be an important and non-arbitrary difference between moral 
agents instantiating adjacent moral states km and k . It is true that there 
is a borderline between the redeemably evil and the irredeemably evil. 
The borderline cases include all of the indefinitely irredeemably evil 
moral states. But there is yet another, second-order, borderline between 
the definitely irredeemably evil and the indefinitely irredeemably evil. The 
borderline cases include all of the indefinitely definitely irredeemably evil 
moral states. Figure (1) depicts the first-order borderline but fails to depict 
the second-order borderline.21
We have been supposing that there are very small increments in evil. 
But if increments in evil are sufficiently small and kni and k(n+1)i are adjacent 
moral states, then the moral state k would be on the second-order bor-(n+1)i
derline of irredeemable evil. But if k is on the second-order borderline(n+1)i
of irredeemable evil, then there is no important and non-arbitrary moral 
distinction between moral states km and k , +1)t. Any two moral agents S and 
S' that instantiate the moral states km and k(n+1)i are such that both agents are 
borderline irredeemable evil. S is on the first-order borderline and S' is 
on the second-order borderline. The difference between S and S', in short, 
is that S is definitely, indefinitely irredeemably evil and S' is indefinitely, 
definitely irredeemably evil.
The situation is depicted in figure (2) where we show both first-order 
and second-order borderlines.
kn k . k. i1v k0 ni (n+1)i
I--------------------------I--I-------------1
Redeemably Evil Irredeemably Evil
Fig. 2
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The darker shaded region of figure (2) includes those moral states-in- 
cluding the moral state kni—that are definitely, indefinitely irredeemably 
evil. The lighter shaded region to the right includes those moral states-in- 
cluding the moral state k -  that are indefinitely, definitely irredeemably
evil. And the unshaded region to the further right are all of those moral 
states that are definitely, definitely irredeemably evil. Since both S and S' 
are borderline irredeemably evil, there is no important and non-arbitrary 
moral difference between them. But then, contrary to the argument so far, 
S and S' cannot be treated in very unequal ways. The proportionality of 
justice condition is therefore not falsified.
The right response to the objection from higher-order vagueness is to 
note that, by hypothesis, every moral state in the sequence is instantiated. 
So again there will be some moral agents S and S' such that S' is not defi­
nitely morally worse than S and such that there is an important and non­
arbitrary moral difference between S and S'. Consider figure (3).
kn k . L i1v k0 ni (n+1)i
I------------------------------I--I-------------1
Redeemably Evil Irredeemably Evil
Fig. 3
Let S' instantiate the moral state k )i that is clearly in the unshaded region 
to the right. S' is not on any borderline-neither a first-order nor second 
order borderline—of irredeemable evil. S' is definitely, definitely irre­
deemably evil and so S' cannot be saved.22
Let S instantiate the moral state k . S is on the borderline—in this caseni
a second-order borderline—of irredeemable evil. Specifically S is indefi­
nitely, definitely irredeemably evil. But S is nonetheless on the borderline 
of irredeemable evil and so he is not beyond the possibility of redemption. 
He is instead almost beyond the possibility of redemption.
So, we arrive again at our previous conclusion. S' is not definitely mor­
ally worse than S but there remains an important and non-arbitrary moral 
difference between S' and S that justifies treating S' and S in very unequal 
ways. S' is among the irredeemably evil and S is on the borderline of the 
irredeemably evil.
Of course the objection from second-order vagueness arises again at 
the third order of vagueness and so on upward. But the response to the 
problem of second-order vagueness can be generalized. Let's define super­
definite irredeemable evil in SE.
SE. Moral agent S is superdefinitely irredeemably evil if and only if for 
every order of vagueness n, it is true that S is definitelyn irredeem­
ably evil.
A moral agent S is superdefinitely irredeemably evil, then, just in case S 
is irredeemably evil and S is not on any borderline of irredeemable evil. So, 
for a simpler formulation of (SE) consider the equivalent (SE').
SE'. Moral agent S is superdefinitely irredeemably evil if and only if S 
is irredeemably evil and S is not borderline irredeemably evil.
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In figures (1) and (3), for instance, the moral state k is not on any bor­
derline of irredeemable evil and so k( is not only definitely irredeem­
ably evil but superdefinitely irredeemably evil as well. The important and 
non-arbitrary moral difference between agents S and S', then, is that S is 
on some borderline or other of irredeemable evil and S' is superdefinitely 
irredeemably evil.
The claim that there is an important and non-arbitrary moral difference 
between S and S' does not commit us to the position that there is a precise 
border between moral agents that are not irredeemably evil and moral 
agents that are irredeemably evil. The claim that there is an important and 
non-arbitrary moral difference between S and S' commits us instead to the 
Vague Depravity Thesis and the Moral Difference Thesis. Here is the Vague 
Depravity Thesis
There is no moral state kn, (k > kn > k0) in S such that for every increment 
i (i > 0) and every admissible precisification, kni is not irredeemably evil 
and k(n+1)i i is irredeemably evil.23
The Vague Depravity Thesis ensures that, for all moral states kn and k(n+1), 
there is some i (i > 0) and some admissible precisification such that a moral 
agent that instantiates k(n+1)i is irredeemably evil only if a moral agent that 
instantiates k is also irredeemably evil. So there is no discrete transition 
from a moral state that is indefinitely irredeemably evil to a moral state 
that is definitely irredeemably evil. And in general there is also no discrete 
transition between a moral state that is indefinitely definitelyn irredeem­
ably evil to a moral state that is definitely irredeemably evil.
The claim that there is an important and non-arbitrary moral difference 
between S and S' also commits us to the Moral Difference Thesis.
If there is some moral state k , (k > k > k ) in S such that for some 
increment i (i > 0), k(n+1)i is irredeemably evil on every admissible pre- 
cisification and kni is not irredeemably evil on some admissible precisi- 
fication, then it is not in general unjust that moral agents instantiating 
k(n+1)i are treated very differently from moral agents instantiating kni .
The Moral Difference Thesis asserts that there might be an important and 
non-arbitrary moral difference between moral agents that instantiate 
nearly the same moral state. It might be that every moral agent that is 
superdefinitely irredeemably evil cannot be saved and every moral agent 
on the borderline of irredeemable evil is not quite beyond redemption.
Finally the view that there is an important and non-arbitrary moral dif­
ference between S and S' commits us to the rejection of the proportional­
ity of justice thesis. The proportionality of justice thesis entails that any 
two moral agents instantiating adjacent moral states must be treated in 
nearly the same way. The proportionality of justice thesis assumes that 
there cannot be an important and non-arbitrary moral difference between 
moral agents that instantiate nearly the same moral state. It assumes, for 
instance, that it's impossible that a moral agent instantiating k ^ y  is irre­
deemably evil and cannot be saved and a moral agent instantiating kni is 
borderline irredeemably evil and so can be saved. But we have found that
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this assumption is mistaken. We should conclude instead that the propor­
tionality of justice thesis is false. It is not in general unjust to treat moral 
agents that instantiate nearly the same moral state in very unequal ways.
Conclusions
The Degree o f Goodness Argument shows that any principle of justice that 
respects degree of goodness among moral agents will violate the propor­
tionality condition in (J'). But the proportionality condition in (J') is false. 
There can be important and non-arbitrary moral differences between 
moral agents that instantiate nearly the same moral state. And those im­
portant moral differences can justify very unequal treatment.
The Vague Depravity Thesis ensures that there is no precise border be­
tween moral agents that are irredeemably evil and moral agents that are 
not irredeemably evil. There is no discrete transition, for instance, from a 
moral state that is definitely irredeemably evil to a moral state that is in­
definitely irredeemably evil. A moral agent that instantiates a moral state 
that is irredeemably evil might not be much worse than a moral agent that 
instantiates a moral state that is not irredeemably evil.
According to the Moral Difference Thesis there can be an important and 
non-arbitrary moral difference between moral agents that instantiate 
nearly the same moral states. It might be, for instance, that all and only 
moral agents that are superdefinitely irredeemably evil cannot be saved. 
And it might also be that moral agents that are on some borderline of ir­
redeemable evil are, fortunately, not quite beyond redemption. Together 
these theses entail that the proportionality of justice condition is false.
Suppose we find it reasonable to reject the proportionality of justice 
condition in (J').24 The right eschatology might then entail that every moral 
agent is either sent determinately to heaven or sent determinately to hell. 
And a perfectly just being might respect the degrees of goodness among 
moral agents in the distribution of these rewards and punishments.25
University o f Texas at San Antonio
NOTES
1. We could abandon the degrees of goodness assumption instead, but it 
seems close to certain that moral states come in degrees.
2. A metaphor might help clarify this claim. Think of evil moral states in 
spatial terms, the worse the moral state the lower the spatial location. There 
might be two moral agents instantiating moral states that are at nearly the 
same spatial location, and one agent might be just out of God's reach while the 
other might be just within God's reach.
3. Let me emphasize that I'm not claiming that it's true that some agents 
are beyond redemption and others are not. I'm claiming rather that it is pos­
sible that some agents are beyond redemption in the sense described and oth­
ers are not.
4. See Theodore Sider, “Hell and Vagueness," Faith and Philosophy 19 
(2002), p. 59, my emphasis.
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5. It is worth noting in passing that principles of justice on which indi­
vidual choice is relevant to determining the distribution of benefits and bur­
dens already raise interesting and important worries for Sider's alleged viola­
tions of the proportionality of justice. Robert Nozick famously urged that any 
principle of justice sensitive to individual property rights would observe the 
maxim: to each as they are chosen and from each as they choose. If Sally plays 
only slightly better than Jimmy, then on Nozick's view, it does not violate the 
proportionality of justice if you choose to give Sally all of your multi-million 
dollar inheritance for her playing and choose to give Jimmy none. See Robert 
Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, Inc. 1974) p. 160ff. 
Even setting aside libertarian conceptions of justice, most see no injustice in 
the fact that the winner of a 100 meter dash might be highly rewarded while 
the fourth place finisher receives next to nothing. And that does not seem un­
just even if the fourth place finisher is just .002 seconds behind the winner.
6. Theodore Sider, “Hell and Vagueness," pp. 59-60
7. The Degree of Goodness Argument is not based on any epistemological 
assumptions. The repugnant conclusion is that any principle of justice that 
might be used to distribute rewards and punishments must violate some pro­
portionality condition. A moral agent S uttering n obscenities goes determi­
nately to heaven and a moral agent S' uttering n +1 obscenities goes deter­
minately to hell. The injustice Sider notes is not that S' did not know that the 
punishment for uttering n + 1 obscenities was eternal damnation. The injustice 
is not that moral agents do not know which principles of justice are being 
applied to them. To simplify matters let's assume that everyone knows that 
anyone that utters n + 1 obscenities is eternally damned and anyone that utters 
n obscenities goes to heaven. To simplify further let's assume that every agent 
knows how many obscenities he has uttered.
8. Theodore Sider, “Hell and Vagueness," p. 60. It is important that the 
problem Sider discussion generalizes to more realistic criteria. As one referee 
for this journal mentioned, the quantitative obscenity criterion is obviously 
implausible in view of typical non-quantitative models of sin.
9. Of course there might be no best or worst moral state. If so then assume 
that moral state k0 is so good that any moral agent that instantiates k0 goes 
determinately and eternally to heaven and the moral state k is so bad that any 
moral agent that instantiates k goes determinately and eternally to hell.
10. In decision-theory the symbol e is often used to represent some very 
small increment. I use instead the variable i to represent some small increment 
in evil; I use ni to represent (n x i) evils; and I use kni to represent the moral 
state resulting from having committed (n x i) evils. Assuming we can measure 
the size and number of small evils, n is some positive integer and i is some 
small real value.
11. Strictly, the Degree of Goodness Argument assumes that it is possible that 
moral agents instantiate every moral state in the sequence, not that moral 
agents actually instantiate every moral state in the sequence. Sider notes,
Suppose further that there are no “gaps" in realized obscenity levels, 
in that for no n is it the case that someone utters n obscenities, someone 
utters some greater number of obscenities, but no one utters n + 1 ob­
scenities. (This assumption is arguably harmless, for we may focus our 
attention on some possible world in which it holds . . .). pp. 59-60
12. A referee urged that, for all we know, “God's unlimited grace would 
guarantee that no moral state kni is sufficiently bad that an agent instantiat­
ing kni is beyond redemption." Call that the redemption assumption. If the 
redemption assumption is both true and inconsistent with Sider's assumption
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of non-universalism, then Sider's argument is unsound. I'm happy with that 
conclusion. But the redemption assumption might well be consistent with 
non-universalism. Suppose it is true that every moral agent that does not reject 
God as savior—no matter how bad her moral state—is thereby saved and 
no moral agent that rejects God as savior—no matter how good her moral 
state—can be saved. It is then true that no moral state k is sufficiently bad 
that any agent that instantiates kni is beyond redemption and also true that 
moral agents that freely reject God as savior cannot be saved. I consider this 
possibility in section 5.
13. A referee suggested a definition of redeemable moral states along these 
lines.
R. A moral state kni of an agent S is redeemable if and only if there is a world 
w and agent S' that instantiate kni in w and S' goes to heaven in w.
(R) raises interesting questions concerning whether agents that are redeem­
able relative to one divine criterion C consistent with God's perfect justice are 
also redeemable relative to any other criterion C' consistent with God's perfect 
justice. According to (R), an agent S instantiating kni is redeemable just in case 
there is some world w at which some criterion C consistent with God's perfect 
justice obtains, some agent S' instantiates kni, and S' goes to heaven. But sup­
pose criterion C' actually obtains rather than C? I would (tentatively) advance 
an alternative analysis of redeemable evil that is relativized to a criterion C 
consistent with God's perfect justice.
I. A moral state kni of an agent S is redeemable relative to a criterion C con­
sistent with God's perfect justice if and only if there is some world w at 
which C obtains, an agent S' instantiates kni in w and S' goes to heaven.
14. There is a complex relationship between the possibility of middle 
knowledge and the possibility of irredeemably evil moral agents. As I under­
stand suggestions from Clayton Littlejohn and Luke Gelinas (in discussion), 
they each urge that if T is the largest state of affairs that God can strongly ac­
tualize, then if (i) God knows that, were he to actualize T, I would freely harm 
someone and (ii) God actualizes T anyway, then (iii) God is at least partially 
blameworthy for the harm produced. One might urge further that I am not 
entirely to blame for my resulting moral state. I'm unpersuaded in either case. 
God does not seem blameworthy, for instance, if he could not have failed to 
actualize T without weakly actualizing a world that was less-than-the-best 
(weakly) actualizable. But I concede that a full discussion of this and related 
problems would require at least another paper.
15. There are theological concerns about when S instantiates an irredeem­
ably evil moral state. If S instantiates an irredeemably evil moral state before 
the time of judgment, then perhaps S is not beyond the possibility of redemp­
tion. We are assuming that, possibly, there is a point at which any agent that 
instantiates an irredeemably evil moral state is beyond redemption.
16. A referee suggested that the assumption that God has divine control 
over the criterion of justice might be inconsistent with any moral agent being 
irredeemably evil. On divine control Sider notes,
Divine control: God is in control of the institution of divine judgment, in 
control of the mechanism or criterion that determines who goes to Heav­
en and who goes to Hell. This is not to say that God is solely responsible 
for the fate of created beings, for the divinely mandated criterion might 
contain a role for free choices. Nor is it to say that God is vindictive. The 
requirement makes no assumptions about the nature of the criterion, 
beyond that it is in God's control. (p. 58)
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And a little further down he adds,
Divine control requires that God be in control of the criterion determin­
ing these populations [i.e., the populations of heaven and hell], and thus
that God's choice of a criterion be consistent with his attributes. The cri­
terion of judgment must therefore cohere with his perfect justice. (p. 58)
The assumption of divine control must be consistent with Sider's assumption 
of non-universalism and God's perfect justice. According to these assumptions, 
it is consistent with God's perfect justice that some moral agents are sent de­
terminately and eternally to hell. We can make these assumptions consistent 
if those agents that are sent determinately and eternally to hell are those God 
cannot, consistent with his justice, save. These agents I call irredeemably evil. 
But if no agents are irredeemably evil, then given the assumption of non-uni- 
versalism, some redeemable moral agents are nonetheless sent determinately 
and eternally to hell. Those agents must have some other property that makes 
them worthy of eternal damnation. I consider this possibility in section 5 on 
degrees of acceptance. Perhaps those redeemable agents freely choose to reject 
God as their savior or to reject his grace. As I show in section 5, the problem for 
the Degree of Goodness Argument re-arises.
17. A referee suggested that the property of being irredeemably evil might 
not be vague. It might be true that there is some moral state kni such that agents 
instantiating kni are definitely redeemably evil and, for any i (i > 0), agents 
instantiating k(n+1)i are definitely irredeemably evil. If that is true then it con­
stitutes a decisive objection against Sider's Degree of Goodness Argument. The 
objection entails that there is an important and non-arbitrary moral difference 
between agents that instantiate k . and agents that instantiate k(n+1)., for any 
i (i > 0), that justifies God in sending the former to heaven and the latter to 
hell. This would be a faster route to my conclusion. My assumption that the 
property of being irredeemably evil is vague concedes to Sider that uttering 
one minor obscenity cannot change an agent from being definitely redeem­
able to being definitely irredeemable. Consistent with Sider's assumption of 
degrees of goodness and badness, I assume there are borderline cases of being 
irredeemably evil in which it is not true that S is irredeemably evil and not 
false that S is irredeemably evil. I do urge that uttering one minor obscenity 
can change an agent from being on some borderline of irredeemably evil to 
being definitely irredeemably evil. I argue that this too makes an important 
and non-arbitrary moral difference for a perfect being that is able to save any 
agent that is borderline irredeemable.
18. The assertion is intended to follow directly from the assumption that 
some moral states k and k in the sequence of moral states from k to k are 
such that an agent that instantiates kni is redeemable and an agent that instan­
tiates kmi is irredeemable. Let kni = k . By hypothesis k0 is a moral state such 
that an agent S instantiates k0 only if S is redeemable, since moral agents that 
instantiate k0 are among the very best relative to the obscenity criterion Sider 
adopts. Let kmi = k. By hypothesis k is a moral state such that S instantiates k 
only if S is irredeemable, since moral agents that instantiate k are the worst 
relative to the obscenity criterion Sider adopts. It might be objected that, for 
all we know, every moral agent is redeemable. But, as I mention in note (3) 
above, I assume only that there might be irredeemable moral agents. It should 
be recalled that Sider also does not claim that all of his assumptions are true. 
He does not insist, for instance, that every moral state is instantiated but only 
that possibly every moral state is instantiated.
19. I claim here that, possibly, a perfect being is governed by PJ1 and PJ2. 
I do not claim that, necessarily, a perfect being is governed by these principles
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(nor, incidentally, do I deny it). We have supposed that an agent S instantiates 
an irredeemably evil moral state kni if and only if S is himself irredeemably evil. 
Further we have supposed that a moral state kni is irredeemably evil if and 
only if kni is sufficiently bad that God cannot save any agent that instantiates kni. 
It is impossible, then, that S instantiates an irredeemably evil moral state and 
also goes determinately to heaven. So we are claiming that possibly God could 
not save S. But aren't there worlds in which (i) God is not governed by PJ1 or 
PJ2 and (ii) S is borderline irredeemable and S' is definitely irredeemable and 
(iii) God sends S and S' determinately and eternally to hell? I'm inclined to 
doubt it, but even if such worlds were possible, they would not be feasible. I 
do not assume in this example that God chooses the principles of justice that 
govern his choices. I assume that possibly PJ1 and PJ2 are true and in those 
worlds they are the principles God applies. I could as well have urged that, 
for all we know, these principles hold in every world. Thanks to Tom Flint for 
pushing this point, though I suspect he won't find this brief response entirely 
satisfying.
20. To avoid additional sources of vagueness, we should add the simplify­
ing assumption that no one indefinitely holds up his card.
21. Sider offers a similar objection. See “Hell and Vagueness," op. cit. p. 
59.
22. Higher-order vagueness is the result of borderline cases themselves 
having borderlines cases. This is perhaps easiest to see with the case of color 
properties.
Consider the sequence of grey below.
k2 k1
|--------------- 1--------1--------
Not Grey Grey
For first-order vagueness we have the area k1 that is definitely grey and a 
single borderline to the left, k2, that is indefinitely grey. But if we acknowl­
edge that there are borderlines cases of our borderline cases, we need to add a 
borderline k3 area between k1 and k2. And the sequence becomes more com­
plicated.
k2 k3 k1
Not Grey Grey
For second-order vagueness we have the area k1 that is definitely, definitely 
grey, the area k2 that is definitely, indefinitely grey, the area k3 that is indefi­
nitely, definitely grey (if k3 is closer in color to k1 than it is to k2) and in­
definitely, indefinitely grey (if k3 is closer in color to k2 than it is to k1). But 
it is reasonable to believe that every border has a border. If so, then orders 
of vagueness go infinitely upward. Suppose you're inclined to believe that 
higher orders of vagueness are unlimited for the predicate 'is irredeemably 
evil.' This presents no problem for the objection I am advancing against Sider 's 
Degree of Goodness Argument, since the existence of higher orders of vague­
ness for 'is irredeemably evil' is consistent with there being some agents that 
are superdefinitely irredeemably evil. The superdefinitely irredeemably evil 
agents are just those agents that are irredeemably evil and on no borderline of 
irredeemable evil.
23. Recall the relation between irredeemably evil moral states and irredeem­
ably evil moral agents discussed above (p. 10 ff.). S instantiates an irredeemably 
evil moral state kni if and only if S is himself irredeemably evil. And a moral 
state k is irredeemably evil if and only if k is sufficiently bad that God cannotni ni
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save any agent that instantiates kni. It is impossible, then, that S instantiates an 
irredeemably evil moral state and also goes determinately to heaven. Given 
the binary conception of the afterlife—that every agent goes determinately to 
heaven or goes determinately to hell—a moral agent S is irredeemably evil 
only if S goes determinately and eternally to hell.
24. It would be a mistake, I think, to abandon (J') altogether. The exception 
to (J') that we have discussed involves a case in which two moral agents in­
stantiate almost the same moral state but cannot be treated in almost the same 
way. One of the agents is irredeemably evil and so, by hypothesis, cannot be 
saved. The other agent is borderline irredeemably evil and so, by hypothe­
sis, is not quite beyond salvation. It might be worth considering whether (J') 
should be restricted to agents that are in nearly the same moral state and can 
be treated in nearly the same way.
25. My gratitude to two referees for this journal and Tom Flint for some 
interesting and challenging comments.
